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Southern	Africa’s	poor	urban	communities.	The	report	was	published	with	
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1. IntroductIon
Southern	Africa	is	one	of	the	most	food	insecure	regions	in	the	world.	
Even	 before	 the	 world	 food	 price	 increases	 of	 2007	 and	 the	 global	
economic	 recession	 in	 2008,	 the	 number	 of	 food	 insecure	 people	 in	
Southern	Africa	was	growing	inexorably.	Between	1990/2	and	2004/6,	
for	 example,	 the	number	of	 food	 insecure	people	 increased	 from	32.4	
million	to	36.7	million.1	Today,	it	is	estimated	to	be	over	40	million.2	Food	
insecurity	 is	partly	a	result	of	particularly	rapid	urbanization.	Cities	are	
growing	at	4-5%	per	annum	and	the	proportion	of	the	population	living	
in	urban	areas	 is	expected	to	exceed	50%	by	2025.	 In	some	countries,	
such	as	South	Africa	and	Botswana,	the	proportion	is	already	over	60%.	
The	capacity	of	cities	to	ensure	food	security	for	all	 is	strained	by	high	
unemployment,	low	wages,	the	challenge	of	integrating	large	numbers	of	
in-migrants,	and	the	persistence	of	HIV	and	AIDS.3
Until	recently,	there	was	an	assumption	that	most	of	the	Southern	African	
region’s	food	insecure	live	in	rural	areas.	Urban	food	insecurity	has	tended	
to	be	overlooked	as	 international	organisations	 and	governments	 focus	
on	 increasing	 small	 farm	production	and	municipal	managers	 focus	on	
other	urban	problems	and	challenges.4	Urban	managers	confront	extreme	
social	 challenges	 including	 persistent	 poverty	 in	 informal	 settlements,	
high	demand	for	social	services,	rapid	in-migration,	and	the	debilitating	
effects	 of	HIV	 and	AIDS.5	Additionally,	 the	downloading	of	 responsi-
bility	for	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	from	national	to	
local	governments,	combined	with	increasing	fiscal	austerity,	has	signifi-
cantly	limited	local	government’s	capacity	to	formulate	and	implement	
effective	food	security	policy.	Urban	food	insecurity	is	often	“unnoticed”	
until	 severe	price	 increases	“scale	up”	 the	 issue	 from	the	household	 to	
the	national	scale.	Scaling	up	is	often	precipitated	by	protests	against	food	
price	 increases.	 Between	 2007	 and	 2008,	 world	 food	 prices	 increased	
significantly,	by	130%	for	wheat,	87%	for	soya,	74%	for	rice,	and	31%	for	
corn.	The	price	increases	caused	significant	civil	unrest	and	deadly	riots	
and	destabilized	many	 low	 income	countries.6	More	 recently,	 in	2010,	
‘bread	riots’	in	Maputo	were	precipitated	by	a	30%	increase	in	the	price	
of	 bread.	 Six	people	died	 in	 the	 violence	 and	 the	 government	quickly	
reversed	the	price	increases.	The	situation	remains	extremely	volatile	in	
Maputo	and	many	other	African	cities.7
In	 most	 cities	 in	 Africa,	 sufficient	 food	 is	 available	 to	 feed	 everyone.	
The	problem	is	one	of	access:	most	poor	households	are	 food	insecure	
because	 they	 cannot	 afford	 to	 purchase	 a	 regular	 supply	 of	 nutritious	
food.8	 Poor	 households	 generally	 lack	 a	 regular	 and	 reliable	 income	
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stream	and	are	extremely	vulnerable	 to	 food	price	 increases.	There	are	
also	 individuals	and	groups	within	cities	without	any	earning	power	at	
all,	 such	 as	 orphans,	 the	 elderly,	 and	 the	disabled.	To	 assist	 these	 food	
insecure	 populations,	 numerous	 interventions	 are	 currently	 utilized	 to	
promote	food	security	in	low	income	countries,	including	direct	feeding	
programmes,	social	assistance,	urban	agriculture,	public	works,	and	food	
price	 controls.	These	programmes	 are	 implemented	by	many	different	
types	 of	 institutions,	 including	multiple	 levels	 of	 government,	NGOs	
(non-governmental	organisations),	CBOs	 (community	based	organisa-
tions),	and	private	sector	businesses.9	
For	 poor	 households	 and	 impoverished	 groups,	 social	 protection	
programmes	(in	the	form	of	cash	or	food	transfers	from	the	state	or	non-
governmental	 actors)	 have	 become	 an	 increasingly	 important	 way	 of	
mitigating	food	insecurity	in	Southern	Africa.	Typically,	multi-national,	
national,	 or	 local	 governmental	 departments	 operate	 feeding	 	 agencies	
and	programmes	for	vulnerable	populations,	such	as	school	children,	the	
elderly,	the	disabled,	and	the	very	poor.	It	is	common	for	direct	feeding	
programmes	to	be	coupled	with	food	for	work	programmes,	cash	for	work	
programmes,	food	stamps,	or	other	social	welfare	services.10	While	food	
redistribution	is	often	associated	with	governmental	departments,	NGOs	
and	CBOs	have	always	been	an	important	fabric	of	feeding	programmes	
through	 food	pantries,	 soup	kitchens,	 shelters,	crèches,	and	other	 local	
food	organisations.	
One	form	of	social	protection	which	is	likely	to	be	of	growing	importance	
involves	the	(re)distribution	of	unused,	surplus	or	donated	food	to	those	
who	need	it.	In	recent	decades,	large	food	warehouses	--	or	“food	banks”	
--	that	collect,	systematize,	and	deliver	food	to	poor	communities	have	
emerged	 as	 important	 institutional	 players	 in	 large	 cities	 in	 developed	
countries.11	More	recently	food	banks	have	been	advocated	as	a	means	of	
ensuring	the	efficient	collection	and	distribution	of	surplus	food	to	poor	
urban	 communities	 in	 developing	 countries.	While	 food	 banking	 has	
grown	rapidly	in	size	and	inf luence,	it	has	not	been	given	much	attention	
as	a	policy	option	in	the	cities	of	the	Global	South.	
The	redistribution	of	donated	food	by	registered	charities	and	NGOs	is	
a	well-established	practice	in	South	African	cities.	Since	2005,	however,	
the	idea	that	large	centralized	food	banks	would	facilitate	food	redistribu-
tion	and	reach	greater	numbers	of	 the	 food	 insecure	has	 taken	hold	 in	
South	Africa.	Over	the	years	that	followed,	with	logistical	and	financial	
support	from	a	national	food	banking	organisation	in	the	United	States,	
a	 similar	 organisation	 (FoodBank	 South	 Africa	 or	 FBSA)	 was	 estab-
lished.	The	question	that	needs	to	be	asked	is	what	impact	the	advent	of	
8 African Food Security Urban Network (Afsun)  
Urban Food Insecurity and the Advent of Food Banking in Southern Africa
American-style	food	banking	will	have	on	the	food	security	of	the	urban	
poor	in	South(ern)	Africa?	The	short	answer	to	this	question	is	that	it	is	
probably	too	soon	to	tell.	What	is	certain,	however,	is	that	food	banking	
does	have	immediate	implications	for	existing	food	redistribution	NGOs,	
some	of	which	have	quickly	 folded	 into	 the	new	 system,	while	 others	
have	been	more	cautious.	
The	 North	 American	 food	 banking	 model	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	
considerable	debate	over	the	years.	Given	that	the	South	African	system	
is	modelled	very	closely	on	the	American	 food	banking	model,	 it	 is	as	
well	to	be	aware	of	the	criticisms	levelled	against	that	model.	The	first	
section	of	this	report	therefore	examines	the	evolution	of	food	banking	in	
North	America	and	the	research	on	its	functioning	and	efficacy.	The	next	
section	reviews	the	transplantation	of	this	model	to	South	Africa	in	the	
last	five	years	and	the	emergence	of	FoodBank	South	Africa.	Finally,	the	
paper	discusses	a	case	study	of	FoodBank	Johannesburg,	one	of	five	food	
banks	that	are	currently	part	of	FBSA.	As	well	as	reviewing	the	origins,	
organisation,	 and	 operation	 of	 FoodBank	 Johannesburg,	 the	 report	
examines	the	implications	of	food	banking	for	existing	food	redistribu-
tion	NGOs.	The	report	concludes	with	a	discussion	and	recommenda-
tions	on	the	potential	of	food	banking	for	resolving	the	“invisible	crisis”	
of	food	insecurity	in	Southern	African	cities.	
2. The Evolution of Food Banking 
Food	banking	emerged	in	the	1960s	in	Phoenix,	Arizona,	in	the	United	
States	 when	 John	 van	 Hengel	 decided	 to	 store	 food	 donations	 in	 a	
centralized	 warehouse	 where	 he	 could	 distribute	 food	 to	 the	 region’s	
hungry	people.12	This	concept	of	food	banking	--	defined	as	warehouses	
that	collect,	systematize,	and	deliver	food	to	non-profit	member	agencies	
--	spread	to	other	US	cities	in	the	1970s	and	1980s.	With	federal	funding	
guaranteed	during	this	critical	start-up	period,	America’s	Second	Harvest	
(now	known	as	Feeding	America),	developed	into	a	central	clearinghouse	
for	national	food	donations.13	
By	the	1990s,	Feeding	America	had	become	the	largest	national	network	
of	food	banks	in	the	United	States.	Today,	it	serves	all	50	states	and	around	
25	 million	 people	 annually	 through	 more	 than	 60,000	 local	 member	
agency	food	pantries,	soup	kitchens	and	shelters.	Moreover,	it	is	now	one	
of	the	ten	largest	charitable	organisations	in	the	United	States.14	Due	to	its	
overall	size	and	inf luence,	Feeding	America’s	four	step	food	redistribu-
tion	model	has	become	the	dominant	food	banking	model	in	the	United	
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States	(Figure	1).	In	this	process,	food	f lows	from	government	agencies,	
food	 industries,	 and	 individuals	 to	 regional	 food	 banks	 to	 beneficiary	
organisations	to	people	in	communities.	Beneficiary	organisations	often	
pay	user	fees	to	food	banks	as	a	way	of	buying	food	for	a	relatively	low	
price.	
Figure 1: US Food Banking Flow Chart
Food transported to bank  
warehouse
Food transported to community 
organisations
Food given to people
Food Retailers and 
Manufacturers
Food Banks
Beneficiary  
Organisations
Households
Source: Feeding America
One	of	the	earliest	--	and	arguably	still	most	important	–	studies	of	US	
food	banks	is	Janet	Poppendieck’s	Sweet Charity: Emergency Food and the 
End of Entitlement.15	Poppendieck	 analyzes	 the	evolution	of	 food	banks	
and	their	beneficiary	organisations	in	the	United	States	from	temporary	
relief	mechanisms	to	permanent	institutions.	She	notes	that	food	banks	
initially	 developed	 as	 a	 means	 to	 confront	 growth	 in	 food	 insecurity	
during	 the	 1970s.	 Subsequently,	 federal	 tax	 incentives	 for	 corporate	
food	donations	facilitated	food	bank	growth	to	a	point	where	they	have	
became	one	of	the	largest	food	security	networks	in	the	United	States.	
Food	banking	has	produced	a	nationally-coordinated	strategy,	increased	
the	efficiency	of	food	donation	processes,	and	provided	many	food	organ-
isations	with	support	and	leadership.	It	has	also	introduced	new	problems	
and	challenges,	including	the	delivery	of	inappropriate,	inadequate,	and	
unstable	food	supplies.	Most	importantly,	Poppendieck	argues	that	food	
banks	have	also	“depoliticized”	hunger	and	poverty,	successfully	shifting	
the	political	 debate	 from	 a	 focus	on	 the	 causes	 of	 structural	 inequality	
to	 strategies	 for	 building	 an	 ever-larger	 social	 service	 structure	 to	 feed	
the	hungry.	Building	on	Wolpert’s	studies	on	the	 limits	of	charity,	she	
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suggests	 that	 food	banks	have	provided	people	with	 the	 false	 idea	 that	
voluntary	 contributions	 of	 time	 and	 money	 can	 effectively	 eradicate	
hunger,	even	as	food	banks	replace	governmental	food	programmes	and	
food	insecurity	rates	remain	high.16
Henderson	argues	that	food	banks	have	now	become	a	key	site	of	social	
struggle	over	the	causes	and	remedies	for	hunger.17	Like	other	umbrella-
like	organisations,	such	as	the	United	Way,	food	banks	redistribute	food	
to	hundreds	of	organisations	with	different	political	views.	As	food	banks	
gain	more	stakeholder	support	and	increased	membership,	they	become	
divorced	from	the	political	perspectives	of	 their	member	organisations.	
This	has	produced	a	contradictory	effect:	food	banks	have	become	legiti-
mized	as	powerful	hunger-fighting	institutions,	yet	they	are	also	limited	
by	the	fact	that	they	have	to	balance	the	various	political	and	economic	
interests	 of	 their	 organisational	 stakeholders,	 including	 private	 donors	
and	various	constituent	organisations.	Ultimately,	this	has	 limited	food	
banking’s	advocacy	roles	in	areas	of	social	policy	and	structural	inequality	
more	broadly.	
Poppendieck’s	ground-breaking	critique	of	food	banking	has	been	further	
augmented	by	Patricia	Allen	who	places	food	banks	within	the	context	
of	ever-growing	anti-hunger	and	community	food	movements	in	urban	
areas.18	Allen	notes	that	even	as	food	banks	grow	in	size	and	inf luence,	
urban	community	 food	movements	have	burgeoned	across	 the	United	
States.	 She	 notes	 that	 community	 food	 movements	 are	 promoting	 a	
different	approach	to	food	insecurity,	one	which	promotes	local	processes	
of	self-empowerment	and	environmental	sustainability,	not	the	feeding	
schemes	regularly	associated	with	the	food	bank	network.	Studies	of	food	
banks	in	Canadian	cities	demonstrate	that	Canadian	food	banking	has	a	
similar	structure	and	the	same	limitations	as	that	in	the	United	States.19	
As	in	the	US,	Canadian	food	banks	have	emerged	as	major	institutional	
players,	 even	 as	 food	 justice	movements	 have	 grown	 in	 importance	 in	
many	urban	areas.20		
Non-profit	food	banks	in	American	cities	such	as	Chicago	have	commer-
cialized	their	operations	in	order	to	respond	to	increased	demand,	enhance	
their	 institutional	 independence	 from	 government,	 and	 reassert	 their	
local	dominance	in	emergency	food	service	delivery.21	For	the	member	
agency	of	the	food	bank,	the	consolidation	of	food	banking’s	institutional	
power	has	produced	new	bureaucratic	limitations,	user	fees	and	increased	
competition.	Metropolitan	food	banks	have	become	important	players	in	
neoliberal	urban	governance	regimes,	as	they	control	the	conceptualiza-
tion	of	hunger,	the	management	of	poverty	and	the	organisation	of	food	
distribution	systems.
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As	Feeding	America	has	grown	in	size	and	inf luence	during	the	1990s	
and	2000s,	international	attention	has	focused	on	its	methods	and	opera-
tions	 as	 a	 model	 to	 emulate.	 In	 2006,	 demand	 for	 international	 food	
banking	 led	 to	 a	 spin-off	 organisation	 called	 the	Global	 FoodBanking	
Network	 (or	 GFN),	 also	 located	 in	 Chicago,	 Illinois.22	 The	 Global	
FoodBanking	Network	is	a	non-profit	organisation	funded	primarily	by	
wealthy	individuals	and	corporations,	including	many	food	retailers	and	
manufacturers	based	in	the	United	States.23	Although	technically	founded	
with	leaders	from	the	American,	Canadian,	Argentinean,	and	Mexican	
food	banks,	Feeding	America	has	 led	 the	drive	 to	spread	 food	banking	
across	 the	world.24	According	 to	 their	most	 recent	 financial	 statement,	
the	Global	FoodBanking	Network’s	revenue	is	disproportionately	from	
corporate	and	 foundation	contributions	 (64%)	and	donated	goods	and	
services	 (27%).	Major	contributors	 include	Cargill,	Kellogg	Company,	
and	Kraft,	among	other	individuals,	foundations,	and	corporations.	
Since	its	founding	in	2006,	the	Global	FoodBanking	Network	has	been	
instrumental	in	the	development	of	food	banking	systems	in	18	different	
countries	on	six	continents.	They	include	Argentina,	Colombia,	Guate-
mala,	Mexico	 and	Peru	 in	Central	 and	 South	America;	 India	 and	 the	
Philippines	in	Asia,	and	South	Africa	and	Ghana	in	Africa.25	The	Global	
FoodBanking	Network	facilitates	food	bank	development	in	various	ways	
depending	on	the	location.	These	include	the	evaluation	of	ideal-type	food	
banking	models	for	particular	contexts,	leadership	and	technical	training	
for	food	bank	administrators,	funding	and	staffing	to	develop	and	manage	
food	bank	systems,	and	administration	of	grants	to	support	food	banking.	
While	the	Global	FoodBanking	Network	works	with	local	stakeholders	
to	develop	food	banking	systems	which	fit	into	local	contexts,	Feeding	
America’s	model	of	food	banking	is	often	used	as	the	best	practice	model	
for	building	and	implementing	a	food	banking	system.	
The	North	American	model	of	food	banking	is	now	spreading	rapidly	to	
other	countries	around	the	world.	While	the	critiques	of	food	banking	
discussed	above	are	limited	to	the	North	American	model,	it	is	important	
to	ask	whether	similar	challenges	will	accompany	the	expansion	of	food	
banking	into	middle	and	low	income	countries.	A	recent	study	of	Brazil	
has	identified	some	of	the	challenges	in	that	country.26	This	report	is	the	
first	to	examine	the	emergence	of	food	banking	in	South	Africa.	
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3. Food BankIng In South aFrIca
A	national	South	African	food	banking	system	emerged	in	2007	through	
the	combined	efforts	of	three	key	stakeholders:	South	African	managers	
of	several	food	security	NGOs,27	the	Global	FoodBanking	Network,	and	
South	African	national	government	administrators	(Figure	2).28	In	2005,	
a	few	key	South	African	NGO	managers	began	to	study	Feeding	America	
and	 solicited	 information	 and	guidance	 from	 the	Global	FoodBanking	
Network	as	 a	way	 to	begin	building	a	 food	banking	network	 in	South	
Africa.29	
Figure 2: Timeline of Food Banking into South Africa
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Key South African NGOs
South African national  
government
Intensive networking
Creation of food security 
forums
Information sharing
FoodBank South Africa
FoodBank South Africa
FoodBank South Africa
FoodBank Cape Town opens
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FoodBank network seeks  
funding
FoodBank opens in new cities
Private sector food  
manufacturers and retailers
Key South African NGOs
South African national and 
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Food security forum meet-
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FoodBank South Africa 
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The	Global	FoodBanking	Network	saw	South	Africa	as	an	ideal	place	to	
build	a	food	bank	system	due	to	its	sound	infrastructure,	political	stability,	
wealthy	 private	 sector,	 strong	 food	 manufacturers	 and	 food	 retailers,	
and	vibrant	NGO	sector.	The	interest	of	South	African	NGOs	in	food	
banking	was	received	with	great	enthusiasm	by	the	Global	FoodBanking	
Network.30	The	development	of	a	national	food	banking	system	in	South	
Africa	was	facilitated	by	the	South	African	Minister	and	Department	of	
Social	 Development	 who	 openly	 supported	 the	 Global	 FoodBanking	
Network’s	 goal	of	building	 food	banking	 in	South	Africa.	The	Global	
FoodBanking	 Network	 and	 South	 African	 government	 then	 system-
atically	surveyed	key	players	in	the	NGO	sector	and	food	industry.	This	
process,	together	with	active	lobbying	for	their	support,	took	18	months	
to	complete.
Many	South	African	food	security	NGOs	were	more	used	to	competing	
than	cooperating,	as	one	food	banking	advocate	argued:
	 They	 all	 try	 to	 do	 the	 same	 thing,	 but	 they	 are	working	 inde-
pendently	and	they	have	been	big		enough	to	see	the	importance	
of	letting	go	of	their	own	little	area	and…	(commit	in	the)	best	
interest	 of	 the	 people.	NGOs	 are	 very	 unsure	 how	much	 they	
want	 to	 share	 with	 other	 NGOs	 because	 they	 (are)	 obviously	
seeing	it	as	competitive.	They	(are)	worried	about	where	they	are	
going	to	get	their	next	funding	from.31	
In	 early	 2008,	 a	 South	African	 Forum	 for	 Food	 Security	was	 formed	
to	integrate	the	numerous	government,	private	sector,	and	civil	society	
players	involved	in	food	security	in	South	Africa.	Simultaneously,	food	
security	 forums	were	 convened	 in	 key	 cities	 such	 as	 Cape	 Town	 and	
Johannesburg.	Initially	these	monthly	meetings	were	attended	by	more	
than	100	 stakeholders.	By	2009,	attendance	had	 fallen	 to	as	 few	as	 ten	
people	at	times.	Part	of	the	reason	for	the	decline	in	attendance	was	the	
inevitable	discord	arising	from	so	many	different	perspectives,	combined	
with	 the	 slow	 and	 sometimes	 overly	 deliberative	 process	 at	 meetings.	
Regardless,	the	forums	were	successful	in	spreading	the	message	of	food	
banking	and	how	it	might	work	in	South	Africa.32	
Towards	the	end	of	2008,	a	number	of	leading	hunger	relief	organisations	
(including	 Feedback	 Food	Redistribution,	 Lions	 Food	Project,	Robin	
Good	 Initiative	 and	 Johannesburg	Foodbank	–	 an	earlier	 initiative	 run	
out	 of	 the	 Johannesburg	 Fresh	Produce	Market	 since	 2006)	 agreed	 to	
amalgamate	 their	 national	 operations	 to	 form	FoodBank	 South	Africa	
(FBSA).	FBSA	was	constituted	in	March	2009	as	a	not-for-profit	(Section	
21)	company,	defining	food	banking	as	follows:
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	 A	food	bank	is	an	organisation	that	acts	on	behalf	of	all	of	the	non-
profit	organisations	(or	“agencies”)	operating	in	its	area.	The	food	
bank	 procures	 food	 (and	 essential	 non-food	 groceries)	 usually	
from	donors	such	as	producers,	manufacturers,	retailers,	govern-
ment	agencies,	individuals	and	other	organisations.	The	food	bank	
defaces	the	donated	product	(to	protect	the	brand)	and	stores	it	in	
one	of	its	warehouses.	FBSA’s	warehouses	are	equipped	to	safely	
sort	 and	 store	 all	manner	 of	 food	 and	non-food	 items.	 Food	 is	
dispatched	from	the	food	bank	every	day	(depending	on	supply)	
and	delivered	to	depots	in	the	communities	where	our	agencies	
are	located.	In	this	way,	we	save	agencies	the	expense	of	having	
to	travel	 long	distances	 to	 fetch	food	from	our	warehouses,	and	
FBSA	saves	itself	the	cost	of	delivering	to	1300	agencies	country-
wide.33
Since	its	inception,	FBSA	has	distributed	5.6	million	kilograms	of	food	
valued	at	R76	million	to	66,000	beneficiaries	per	day.	It	currently	supplies	
food	to	1,278	non-profit	organisations	countrywide	 including	crèches,	
children’s	homes,	old	age	homes,	shelters,	feeding	schemes,	clinics	and	
hospices.	FBSA	says	it	has	a	waiting	list	of	more	than	2,000	agencies.	It	
has	also	launched	a	programme	called	“Lunch	Buddies”	which	redistrib-
utes	sandwiches	from	middle-class	schools	to	schools	in	poor	areas	of	a	
city.	
The	main	focus	of	FBSA	activity	to	date	has	been	the	country’s	major	urban	
centres,	a	tacit	acknowledgement	of	the	severity	of	urban	food	insecurity.	
FoodBank	Cape	Town	opened	its	doors	in	early	2009.	Soon	thereafter,	
food	banks	opened	in	South	Africa’s	other	major	cities,	including	Johan-
nesburg	(May	2009),	Durban	(July	2009),	and	Port	Elizabeth	(September	
2009).	 FoodBank	South	Africa	 plans	 to	 add	 as	many	 as	 16	more	 food	
banks	across	South	Africa	within	2-3	years	and	to	build	a	food	processing	
plant	to	produce	food	for	the	food	banks	(Figure	3).	In	October	2010,	the	
Tshwane	FoodBank	Community	Depot	opened	a	facility	at	the	Tshwane	
Fresh	Produce	Market.	This	is	the	first	food	bank	to	be	run	by	an	affiliate	
organisation,	the	Tshwane	Chapter	of	the	Progressive	Women’s	Move-
ment	of	South	Africa	(PMWSA).	Food	bank	administrators	also	plan	to	
incorporate	 rural	 producers	 into	 the	 food	 banking	 system	 by	 creating	
markets	for	farmers	to	sell	their	goods	direct	to	the	FoodBank.34	
FBSA’s	total	operating	budget	--	including	the	four	urban	network	food	
banks	 --	was	R26.5	million	 in	November	 2009	 (Table	 1).	The	major	
contributors	 are	 the	 state-run	 South	 African	 Lottery	 (R16	 million),	
private	charitable	donations	(R3.3	million)	and	the	Department	of	Social	
Development	 (R3	million).	Private	 sector	 companies,	 including	major	
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Figure 3: Existing and Planned Food Banks in South Africa
food manufacturers and retailers, have contributed over R2 million. 
The Global FoodBanking Network makes a modest contribution of 
US$25,000.35 The funds are distributed by FBSA to each of its member 
food banks. Much of this funding is once-off, so food bank officials 
continue to seek more long-term funding contracts with government 
and private sector donors.36
TABLE 1:  Funding for FoodBank South Africa (November 2009) 
Contributors Source of funding Amount (Rand) Amount (Dollars)
South African National Lotteries 
Foundation Government R16,000,000 $2,133,333
Individual Contributions Private R3,800,000 $506,667
South African National Department 
of Development Government R3,300,000 $440,000
Pioneer Foods Private R1,000,000 $133,333
Sundry Private R995,350 $132,713
Engen Private R518,925 $69,190
Old Mutual Private R500,000 $66,667
Global FoodBanking Network NGO R183,738 $24,498
Investec Private R125,000 $16,667
Other Mixed R62,728 $8,364
Total R26,485,741 $3,531,432
Source: FoodBank South Africa
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4 Foodbank Johannesburg: A Case  
 Study
4.1 Food Insecurity in Johannesburg
In	 this	 study,	 the	 Johannesburg	 metropolitan	 area	 is	 defined	 as	 the	
Witwatersrand	(including	the	Johannesburg	metropolitan	municipality,	
Ekurhuleni	 metropolitan	 municipality,	 and	 West	 Rand	 municipality)	
(Figure	4).	According	to	the	most	recent	census	estimates,	the	Johannes-
burg	metropolitan	area	has	a	population	of	approximately	7.2	million.37	
Collectively,	 these	 three	municipalities	make	 the	 Johannesburg	metro-
politan	area	one	of	the	forty	largest	metropolitan	areas	in	the	world	and	
one	of	only	a	few	global	cities	on	the	African	continent.38	While	Gauteng	
is	already	96%	urbanized,	urban	to	rural	migration	in	the	rest	of	South	
Africa	and	the	Southern	African	region	more	generally	ensures	that	the	
Johannesburg	metropolitan	area	continues	to	receive	new	residents	from	
other	non-urban	areas	throughout	Southern	Africa.39	
Figure 4: Johannesburg Metropolitan Area, Study Area 
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In	contrast	 to	other	 rapidly	urbanizing	 regions	which	are	experiencing	
rapid	industrialization,	Southern	Africa	is	urbanizing	without	concomi-
tant	job	opportunities.	This	has	resulted	in	the	urbanization	of	poverty,	
as	many	rural	residents	migrate	to	cities,	only	to	live	in	informal	settle-
ments	 without	 adequate	 economic	 opportunities.40	 In	 Johannesburg,	
this	has	resulted	in	the	extensive	growth	of	informal	settlements,	such	as	
Diepsloot	and	Orange	Farm.	Furthermore,	the	combination	of	immigra-
tion	and	lack	of	economic	opportunities	has	contributed	to	civil	unrest	
in	 the	 townships	 and	 informal	 settlements	 surrounding	 Johannesburg,	
as	 economic	 desperation	 turned	 into	 xenophobic	 violence	 in	 2008.41	
Therefore,	even	though	Johannesburg	may	seem	“better	off”	than	neigh-
bouring	 urban	 centres,	 high	 expectations	 for	 improved	 quality-of-life	
have	not	been	met	for	all,	as	unemployment,	extreme	inequality,	and	food	
insecurity	persist	in	Greater	Johannesburg.
According	 to	 a	 recent	AFSUN	 study	 on	 food	 insecurity	 in	 Johannes-
burg,	 approximately	 2	 million	 people	 are	 food	 insecure	 with	 15%	 of	
households	 rating	as	moderately	 food	 insecure	and	27%	of	households	
as	severely	food	insecure.42	In	addition,	households	tend	to	eat	foods	that	
are	calorie	dense,	full	of	sugar,	but	low	in	fibre,	while	they	eat	fewer	foods	
with	micronutrient	dense	pulses	and	fruit	and	vegetables.43	These	dietary	
patterns	are	associated	with	dietary	related	chronic	illnesses.
Another	study	shows	that	Gauteng	children	consume	white	sugar,	maize,	
whole	milk,	tea,	and	brown	bread	more	than	any	other	food	and	drink	
products.44	 The	 Gauteng	 Department	 of	 Health	 notes	 that	 compared	
to	children	 in	eight	other	provinces,	Gauteng	children	have	 the	 lowest	
carbohydrate	intake,	highest	sugar	intake,	and	second	highest	fat	intake.45	
Gauteng	 children	 also	 have	 deficient	 levels	 of	 vitamin	 A,	 vitamin	 C,	
calcium,	 iron,	 and	 zinc.	According	 to	 the	most	 recent	National	 Food	
Consumption	Survey,	these	problematic	food	choices	produce	negative	
health	outcomes	for	Gauteng	children,	including	stunted	growth	(20%),	
underweight	 (9%),	 obesity	 (6%),	 and	wasting	 (1%).46	 For	 the	 31%	of	
Gauteng	 residents	 infected	 with	 HIV	 in	 2006,	 the	 ramifications	 of	
poor	diet	can	be	severe,	as	anti-retroviral	medicines	are	only	effective	in	
conjunction	with	a	healthy	diet	and	adequate	nutritional	intake.47	In	all,	
this	data	suggests	that	food	insecurity,	malnutrition,	and	hunger	remain	
a	significant	problem	for	Johannesburg	residents	and	illustrate	the	need	
for	new	urban	food	interventions	that	can	reduce	the	prevalence	of	food	
insecurity	(Table	2).
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TABLE 2:  Food Insecurity Rates in Johannesburg
Food Insecurity Rates Percentage
Household Food Insecurity 42
 Severe 27
 Moderate 15
Childhood Stunted Growth 20
Childhood Underweight 9
Childhood Obesity 6
Childhood Wasting 1
Source: Rudolph et al, “Food Security, Poverty and Health”;  
Hendricks et al, National Food Consumption Survey.
AFSUN	found	that	in	Johannesburg	the	majority	of	households	buy	food	
through	the	cash	economy,	particularly	through	supermarkets,	small	shops	
and	restaurants	and	the	informal	sector	(Table	3).48	Informal	markets	and	
sellers	are	patronised	far	more	often	than	the	other	two	sources.	Only	9%	
of	households	surveyed	actually	grow	some	of	their	own	food,	although	
the	proportion	is	higher	in	peri-urban	areas	(16%)	than	townships	(8%),	
and	the	inner	city	(2%)	where	land	is	less	available.	Communal	sharing	
of	food	resources	is	actually	more	significant	than	urban	agriculture	and	
includes	shared	meals	with	neighbours	(14%),	food	provided	by	neigh-
bours	(13%),	and	borrowing	food	from	others	(6%).	
TABLE 3:  Household Sources of Food for Johannesburg Residents 
 Food Source % of HH Using Source
 Supermarket 96
 Small Shop or Restaurant 80
 Informal Market or Street Food 85
 Grow It 9
 Food Aid 2
 Remittances (Food) 2
 Shared Meal with Neighbors 14
 Food Provided by Neighbors 13
 Community Food Kitchen 9
 Borrow Food From Others 6
Source: Crush and Frayne, Pathways to Insecurity
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Cash	 transfer	 programmes	 are	 the	 South	 African	 government’s	 most	
important	mechanism	to	confront	poverty	and	food	insecurity	in	cities.	
In	 Johannesburg,	 the	 South	 African	 government	 operates	 numerous	
programmes	which	provide	money	that	is	used	to	purchase	food.	Most	of	
these	are	“social	grants”	operated	through	the	South	Africa	Social	Security	
Agency	(SASSA),	an	independent	agency	which	reports	to	the	Depart-
ment	of	Social	Development	 (DSD).	Social	 grants	 are	provided	 to	 the	
aged,	war	veterans,	disabled,	those	caring	for	vulnerable	children	(foster	
care,	 child	dependency,	 and	 child	 support),	 and	grant	 in	 aid	 (in-home	
full	time	care).49	Additionally,	since	2004,	the	South	African	government	
has	 promoted	 job	 creation	 programmes	 as	 a	way	 to	 reduce	 food	 inse-
curity.	Through	the	Expanded	Public	Works	Programme,	for	example,	
thousands	of	people	have	been	employed	on	governmental	projects	and	
received	money	 in	 turn.50	 In	 all,	 these	 cash	 transfer	 programmes	 have	
provided	hundreds	of	thousands	of	people	in	Johannesburg	with	needed	
money	to	purchase	food	in	the	formal	and	informal	economy.	Only	2%	
of	poor	Johannesburg	households	report	receiving	food	aid,	although	9%	
use	community	food	kitchens,	a	figure	which	is	significantly	higher	than	
for	other	Southern	African	cities.51	
Numerous	 institutional	 players	 are	 involved	 in	 providing	 direct	 food	
transfers.	While	there	are	governmental	programmes	which	provide	food	
directly	to	vulnerable	populations,	NGOs	and	CBOs	operate	important	
feeding	schemes,	food	pantries,	and	soup	kitchens.52	Also,	private	sector	
institutions,	including	foreign	and	domestic	donors,	provide	funding	for	
civil	society	food	security	efforts,	while	food	businesses	operate	corpo-
rate	philanthropy	initiatives	and	donate	food	and	money	to	local	NGOs.	
Although	food	redistribution	has	existed	in	South	Africa	for	a	long-time	
through	 local	 religious	organisations	 and	other	community	 food	agen-
cies,	the	emergence	of	the	North	American	food	banking	model	has	only	
emerged	on	the	food	scheme	since	2008.	While	the	food	bank	has	been	
touted	as	a	possible	solution	to	food	insecurity	in	Johannesburg	and	other	
large	 South	 African	 cities,	 it	must	 be	 questioned	whether	 food	 banks	
can	 effectively	 reduce	 food	 insecurity	when	only	 9%	of	 Johannesburg	
residents	actually	use	community	food	kitchens	at	all.	We	now	turn	to	
the	details	of	FoodBank	Johannesburg	to	determine	its	process	of	devel-
opment,	analyze	its	impact	on	existing	NGOs	and	CBOs,	and	assess	its	
potential	as	a	food	insecurity	reducing	institution.
4.2 Research Methodology
Semi-structured	 interviews	were	 conducted	with	 global,	 national,	 and	
local	 food	bank	administrators	between	February	and	July	2009	and	in	
January	2010	to	determine	their	organisational	objectives	and	institutional	
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structure.	Administrators	at	the	Global	FoodBanking	Network	and	FBSA	
provided	important	international	and	national	context	for	the	develop-
ment	 of	 food	 banking	 in	 South	Africa.	Managers,	 administrators,	 and	
fieldworkers	 at	FoodBank	 Johannesburg	described	how	 the	 food	bank	
process	evolved,	including	their	relations	with	the	state,	civil	society	and	
the	 private	 sector.	 Also,	 they	 revealed	 the	 motivations	 and	 objectives	
behind	 different	 institutional	 players,	 identifying	 zones	 of	 institutional	
friction	and	internal	dissension.53	
These	interviews	were	supplemented	during	short	periods	of	participant	
observation	 as	 a	 volunteer	 at	 FoodBank	 Johannesburg,	 attending	 the	
Johannesburg	FoodBank	Grand	Opening	on	May	26,	2009	and	partici-
pating	 in	multiple	 Johannesburg	based	Food	Security	Forum	meetings	
between	March	 2009	 and	 July	 2009.	 The	 purpose	 of	 these	 meetings	
was	to	encourage	stakeholder	participation	in	the	food	bank’s	develop-
ment	process.	Participants	included	government,	private	sector,	and	civil	
society	 players	 involved	 in	 food	 security	 in	 South	Africa.	 In	 addition,	
detailed	case	studies	of	civil	society	organisations	involved	in	food	security	
were	conducted	to	investigate	how,	if	at	all,	the	development	of	Food-
Bank	Johannesburg	has	transformed	state-civil	society	relations	and	the	
institutional	relations	of	NGOs	and	CBOs.	These	case	studies	included	
open-ended	interviews	with	managers	and	staff	to	collect	in-depth	data	
on	basic	organisational	and	funding	structure,	relationships	with	govern-
ment	and	other	civil	 society	organisations,	 and	challenges	 faced	by	 the	
organisation.	
Interviews	were	also	conducted	with	each	NGO’s	network	of	member	
agencies	 to	understand	how	CBOs	 contend	with	both	NGO	partners	
and	state	agencies.	Also,	short	periods	of	volunteer	work	were	conducted	
to	 allow	 participant	 observation	 and	 gather	 more	 nuanced	 contextual	
information	about	the	dynamics	and	operational	strategies	of	the	organ-
isations	and	their	member	agency	relations.	The	resulting	data	provided	
rich	portraits	of	food	security	civil	society	organisations	in	Johannesburg	
and	how	they	negotiate,	contest,	or	ignore	the	processes	related	to	food	
bank	development.
Lastly,	a	comprehensive	census	of	food	security	organisations	in	Johan-
nesburg	was	developed	from	existing	directories	and	snowball	interviews.	
Using	 this	 comprehensive	database,	 a	new	 survey	was	 administered	 to	
identify	NGO	and	CBO	relations	with	FoodBank	Johannesburg.	Survey	
questions	asked	organisational	managers	to	provide	basic	information	on	
the	types	and	quantity	of	services	offered,	amount	and	sources	of	funding,	
and	their	relationship	with	FoodBank	Johannesburg.	
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To	identify	which	organisations	to	survey,	a	master	list	was	created	from	
those	 groups	 identified	 on	 the	 South	 African	 Department	 of	 Social	
Development’s	National	Database	on	Non-Profit	Organisations,	South	
African	 Non-Governmental	 Organisation	 Network’s	 (SANGONeT)	
PRODDER	database,	South	African	NGOs	and	Development	Direc-
tory,	and	from	word	of	mouth	references	from	other	NGOs	and	CBOs.	
Importantly,	 these	 two	 formal	 databases	 do	 not	 ref lect	 all	 urban	 food	
security	 civil	 society	organisations	 in	 Johannesburg,	 as	many	organisa-
tions	are	 small,	 informal,	 legally	unregistered,	 and	 relatively	unknown.	
To	minimize	this	weakness,	organisations	on	the	master	list	were	asked	
about	other	groups	with	whom	they	interact,	using	snowball	techniques	
until	a	saturation	point	was	reached.	Groups	added	to	this	master	list	were	
either	member	 agencies	 of	 a	 larger	 network	of	 organisations,	 informal	
institutional	partners,	or	stand-alone	organisations,	all	three	of	which	are	
of	interest	in	this	study.	While	the	snowball	approach	did	not	identify	the	
entire	universe	of	food	security	organisations,	it	minimized	weaknesses	
intrinsic	to	the	two	available	databases.	These	methods	revealed	approxi-
mately	183	NGOs	and	CBOs,	of	which	49	actually	completed	surveys.	
Survey	administration	was	conducted	in	collaboration	with	a	survey	team	
at	the	University	of	Witwatersrand	between	March	2009	and	July	2009.54	
Surveyors	 were	 trained	 to	 ensure	 inter-rater	 reliability	 and	 validity.	
Surveys	were	conducted	in	person	to	the	extent	possible	(under	specific	
circumstances,	such	as	the	location	of	the	organisation	in	an	area	deemed	
too	dangerous,	some	telephone	responses	were	accepted).	
4.3 The Development of FoodBank Johannesburg
For	a	number	of	reasons,	the	process	of	developing	a	food	banking	system	
in	Johannesburg	was	initially	slow.	The	most	important	factor	was	that	
some	NGO	managers	were	concerned	about	the	potential	 loss	of	their	
organisational	 identity	 and	 about	 new	 food	 bank	 bureaucracies	 devel-
oping.	In	addition,	the	implications	of	supporting	a	large	non-profit	food	
distribution	NGO	took	time	for	local	government	to	fully	appreciate.55	
In	 early	 2009,	 after	 months	 of	 stalling	 and	 prevarication,	 food	 bank	
administrators	and	advocates	decided	that	the	initial	momentum	had	to	
be	carried	through	to	the	actual	opening	of	the	food	bank	or	the	various	
stakeholders	would	lose	interest	and	the	food	bank	might	not	materialize:
	 (They	have)	 their	own	agendas	…What	do	they	want?	What	don’t	
they	want?…We’ve	decided	we’re	not	going	to	wait	any	longer.	We	
are	 sitting	with	 close	 to	 1million	 people	 in	 Joburg	 alone	 starving.	
And,	at	the	moment,	we	are	not	even	covering	20,000	if	we	are	lucky.	
We’re	not	 getting	10	percent.	 I	 don’t	know	what	 the	 rest	of	 them	
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live	on	–	We	can’t	wait	any	longer.	So,	we	got	to	a	point	where	we	
said	we	are	going	to…start	with	the	operations…and	anyone	else	that	
wants	to	join	is	welcome	(to	join)…We	got	to	a	point	where	we’re	
not	going	to	beg	and	plead	any	longer.56	
A	key	development	was	the	decision	by	Feedback	Food	Redistribution	
and	the	Johannesburg	Foodbank	to	fold	their	operations	into	the	newly	
formed	 food	bank.	On	26	May	2009,	FoodBank	 Johannesburg	 finally	
officially	opened	its	operations	when	the	City	of	Johannesburg’s	Joburg	
Market	 (formerly	 known	 as	 the	 Johannesburg	 Fresh	 Produce	Market)	
gave	the	food	bank	750	square	feet	of	warehouse	space	for	a	sub-market	
rent	in	a	central	Johannesburg	location.57	
By	mid-2010,	 FoodBank	 Johannesburg	was	 delivering	more	 than	 200	
metric	tons	of	food	each	month	to	over	440	beneficiary	agencies	in	the	
metropolitan	 area,	 including	 feeding	 schemes,	 soup	 kitchens,	 crèches,	
old	age	homes,	and	HIV	clinics.58	At	this	point,	only	those	organisations	
originally	affiliated	with	the	Johannesburg	Foodbank	and	Feedback	Food	
Redistribution	are	part	of	this	network.	In	the	future,	FoodBank	Johan-
nesburg	plans	to	reach	as	many	as	5,000	beneficiary	organisations	and	up	
to	2	million	people,	which	would	make	it	one	of	the	world’s	largest	food	
banks.59	
FoodBank	 Johannesburg	 operates	 in	 a	way	 that	 is	 consistent	with	 the	
Global	FoodBanking	Network	model.	Although	primarily	resourced	by	
food	manufacturers	and	food	retailers	as	of	2010,	FoodBank	Johannes-
burg	administrators	are	 in	the	process	of	securing	food	donations	 from	
a	wider	 range	 of	 institutions.60	 These	 include	 both	 public	 and	 private	
donors,	 including	 the	 South	African	 government,	 farms	 and	 fisheries,	
food	retailers,	food	wholesalers,	and	food	supermarkets	(Figure	5).61
The	amount	and	timing	of	donations	is	often	uneven,	as	food	is	typically	
delivered	when	private	sector	food	businesses	need	to	off load	excess	or	
mislabelled	food.	Donated	food	can	vary	significantly	from	fresh	produce,	
poultry,	 and	meats	 to	 canned	 goods,	 bottled	 drinks,	 and	 condiments.	
These	perishable	and	non-perishable	food	products	are	transported	from	
donors	to	FoodBank	Johannesburg	via	truck	before	the	food	can	spoil.	
Once	the	food	arrives	at	FoodBank	Johannesburg,	food	products	are	typi-
cally	 sorted	and	repackaged	 into	smaller	more	manageable	sizes.	These	
donations	 are	 then	 warehoused,	 refrigerated,	 and	 stored	 at	 FoodBank	
Johannesburg	until	they	can	be	delivered	to	beneficiary	agencies	(or	food	
aid	agencies)	who	are	members	of	FoodBank	Johannesburg’s	network	of	
food	organisations.	From	there,	households	can	access	 food	from	these	
beneficiary	 food	pantries,	 soup	kitchens,	 crèches,	 and	other	 local	 food	
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organisations.	Thus,	people	can	only	access	food	from	FoodBank	Johan-
nesburg’s	affiliated	beneficiary	organisations,	not	the	food	bank	itself.62
To	be	eligible	 for	 food,	beneficiary	organisations	have	 to	register	with	
FoodBank	Johannesburg	or	show	evidence	of	their	organisational	mission	
to	feed	the	hungry.	However,	due	to	high	demand	for	food	resources,	it	
is	likely	that	FoodBank	Johannesburg	will	have	to	limit	the	number	of	
food	beneficiary	 organisations	 receiving	 food,	 at	 least	 until	 food	bank	
resources	increase.	While	no	member	fees	are	assessed	at	present,	there	
is	 a	 strong	 possibility	 that	 a	 small	 fee	will	 be	 required	 for	 future	 food	
organisations	 to	 become	 registered	members	 of	 FoodBank	 Johannes-
burg.	However,	this	proposal	remains	hotly	contested.	63	
While	food	bank	administrators	emphasize	integrity,	accountability,	and	
efficiency,	the	food	bank	operates	on	a	more	ad	hoc	basis.64	Many	ques-
tions	remain	unresolved:	How	often	and	in	what	ways	will	beneficiary	
agencies	be	 allowed	 to	collect	 food?	Will	 they	pay	member	 fees?	Will	
these	agencies	be	allowed	to	be	permanent	food	bank	members?	Addi-
tionally,	future	funding	is	uncertain.	According	to	one	food	bank	admin-
istrator,	 FoodBank	 Johannesburg	 needed	 approximately	 R5.8	million	
Source: FoodBank South Africa
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to	continue	food	bank	operations	over	the	ten	month	stretch	from	May	
2009	to	March	2010.	Yet,	even	this	high	level	administrator	was	not	sure	
who	was	sourcing	the	money.65	
Prior	to	the	advent	of	FoodBank	Johannesburg	(Figure	6),	food	security	
NGOs	tended	to	receive	food	directly	from	private	sector	food	manufac-
tures	and	food	retailers.	NGOs	received	money	from	private	foreign	and	
domestic	donors	and	food	donations	from	food	manufacturers	and	food	
retailers.	The	foodstuffs	were	then	donated	directly	to	community-based	
organisations	(CBOs).	The	emergence	of	FBSA	and	the	FoodBank	Johan-
nesburg	has	 led	 to	new	 institutional	 relationships.	While	many	NGOs	
continue	 working	 in	 collaboration	 with	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 CBOs	
remain	marginalized,	FoodBank	Johannesburg	is	transforming	how	the	
network	of	urban	 food	security	organisations	operates	 in	 Johannesburg	
(Figure	7).	While	 some	NGOs	have	 successfully	 adapted	 to	FoodBank	
Johannesburg’s	 institutional	 presence,	 others	 face	 new	 challenges	 and	
an	 uncertain	 future.	The	 remainder	 of	 this	 study	 examines	 FoodBank	
Johannesburg’s	effects	on	food	delivery	NGOs.	
4.4 Food Delivery NGOs: Objectives and Structure
The	 food	 security	NGOs	 considered	 here	 include	 Joint	Aid	Manage-
ment,	 Robin	 Good	 Initiative	 and	Meals	 on	Wheels	 (Table	 4).	 These	
food	security	NGOs	rejected	the	option	of	folding	their	operations	into	
the	Johannesburg	FoodBank	and	decided	instead	to	work	with	the	food	
bank	but	maintain	their	institutional	independence.	These	NGOs	have	
developed	strong	reputations	over	many	years	of	work	and	were	therefore	
resistant	to	incorporation.	
TABLE 4:  Food Delivery NGOs
 
Joint Aid 
Management
Robin Good 
Initiative
Meals on 
Wheels
Budget (Rand) R4,500,000* R10,324,303** R480,000**
People Served (per month) 5,000*  120,000* 20,000**
Funding Type Mostly Private Mostly Private Mostly Private
* National figure **Johannesburg figure
Founded	 in	1984,	 Joint	Aid	Management	or	 JAM	(formerly	 Jesus	Aid	
Ministries)	is	a	faith-based	organisation	which	operates	feeding	schemes	
throughout	Africa	(Table	5).66	Joint	Aid	Management	does	not	use	the	
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food	bank	logic	of	food	redistribution;	rather,	it	primarily	operates	feeding	
schemes	for	children.	Although	the	majority	of	its	programmes	are	located	
outside	South	Africa,	JAM	does	have	major	school	feeding	programmes	
in	the	Johannesburg	metropolitan	area,	feeding	thousands	of	children	in	
schools	in	informal	settlements	in	Orange	Farm	and	Ekurhuleni.	
In	 the	 2007-2008	 fiscal	 year,	 JAM’s	 international	 budget	was	R104.8	
million	 which	 helped	 feed	 498,000	 children	 across	 Africa.	 Only	 4	
percent	of	 the	total	budget	 is	geared	towards	 food	 insecurity	program-
ming	 in	 South	Africa	 and	 only	 1	 percent	 of	 children	 fed	 by	 JAM	 are	
actually	 in	 South	 Africa.	 In	 2008-2009,	 JAM’s	 South	 African	 budget	
was	R4.5	million	with	approximately	5,000	children	served	per	month	
across	South	Africa.67	The	South	African	budget	comprises	81%	private	
donations,	17%	foreign	foundation	grants,	and	2%	domestic	foundation	
grants.	In	contrast	to	some	NGOs,	it	is	fully	funded	by	private	donations	
and	foundation	grants	and	receives	no	funding	from	government.
Figure 6: Johannesburg Food Security Organisations Prior to  
 FoodBank Johannesburg
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Figure 7:  Johannesburg Food Security Organisations after Advent of  
 FoodBank Johannesburg
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TABLE 5: Joint Aid Management Organisational Profile
Organisation Location Gauteng
Organisation Service Area Gauteng
Food Gardening Yes
Feeding Schemes Yes
Soup Kitchen No
Other Services Yes – Take home rations
Served per Month 5,000 people
Want to Serve per Month 12,000 people
Size of Budget R4,500,000 
Private donations 82%
Foreign Private Donations NA
Domestic Private Donations NA
Foundation Grants 19%
Foreign Foundation Grants 17%
Domestic Foundation Grants 2%
Government Grants and Contracts 0%
Foreign Government Grants and Contracts 0%
Domestic Government Grants and Contracts 0%
Fees, Sales, and Dues 0%
Investment Income 0%
Rental Income 0%
Other Income 0%
Lack of Government Funding Yes
Lack of Private Donations No
Lack of Contacts with Potential Funding Sources Yes
Delays and Red Tape Associated with Financial Support No
Other Problems Yes – Ineligibility for grants
Full Time Paid Staff 8
Part Time Paid Staff 0
Volunteers 10
Hours per Week Organisation Spends Applying for Government Money 5 
Hours per Week Organisation Spends Raising Private Sector Money 5 
Percentage of Staff With College or University Degrees Less than 20%
Heard about FoodBank South Africa Yes
Means of learning about FoodBank South Africa Meeting with GFN
Effect of Food Bank South Africa on Your Organisation Very Positive
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Founded	in	1997,	the	Robin	Good	Initiative	operates	 like	a	 food	bank	
in	that	it	receives	food	donations	from	food	retailers	and	manufacturers	
and	then	distributes	these	food	products	through	its	member	agencies.68	
In	 addition	 to	 food	banking,	 the	Robin	Good	 Initiative	has	promoted	
2,000	VegeTunnels	as	a	way	to	grow	vegetables	in	gritty	urban	locations,	
such	as	tunnels	and	concrete	streets.69	Compared	to	its	peer	NGOs,	the	
Robin	Good	 Initiative	 is	 quite	 large,	 as	 its	 Johannesburg	 location	 has	
approximately	230	beneficiary	agencies,	with	approximately	750	to	800	
agencies	nationwide	providing	approximately	11	million	meals	to	people	
across	South	Africa.	However,	these	figures	have	diminished	since	early	
2009,	as	the	Cape	Town	branch	of	Robin	Good	folded	into	FoodBank	
Cape	Town.	In	the	2008-2009	fiscal	year,	the	Johannesburg	Robin	Good	
Initiative’s	operating	budget	was	R10.3	million.70	
Due	to	its	size	and	food	banking	mentality,	the	Robin	Good	Initiative	is	
a	natural	fit	for	FoodBank	Johannesburg,	but	administrators	at	the	Robin	
Good	Initiative	were	concerned	about	losing	their	identity	and	therefore	
decided	not	to	fold	their	operations	in	Johannesburg.	Since	each	Robin	
Good	Initiative	is	a	franchise	and	manages	its	own	operations,	each	loca-
tion	 can	 choose	 to	 remain	 independent	 or	 fold	 into	 FoodBank	 South	
Africa.	 Unlike	 the	 Robin	 Good	 Initiative	 in	 Cape	 Town,	 the	 Robin	
Good	Initiative	started	its	first	operations	in	the	Johannesburg	area	and	
built	 a	 long-term	 investment	 in	 the	 Johannesburg	 community	 more	
broadly	which	made	it	more	hesitant	to	fold.71	Although	it	is	still	possible	
that	the	Robin	Good	Initiative	would	merge	with	FoodBank	Johannes-
burg,	 it	 seems	unlikely.	 In	 the	 coming	years,	 the	management	of	 each	
Robin	Good	Initiative	warehouse	will	have	to	decide	how	to	proceed	in	
relation	to	FoodBank	South	Africa.	Even	 if	 the	Robin	Good	Initiative	
remains	in	certain	cities,	it	will	have	to	compete	with	FoodBank	South	
Africa	for	potential	donors.	Overall,	it	is	unclear	how	this	will	impact	the	
institutional	capacity	of	the	Robin	Good	Initiative	over	the	long-term.
Meals	 on	 Wheels	 is	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 feeding	 NGOs	 in	 the	 world,	
started	in	1939	during	World	War	II	in	the	United	Kingdom.72	There	are	
approximately	81	branches	 throughout	South	Africa	with	35	branches	
in	the	Johannesburg	metropolitan	area.73	The	core	mission	of	Meals	on	
Wheels	 is	 to	provide	elderly	people	with	 food	access.	However,	Meals	
on	Wheels	also	provides	other	basic	services	as	well,	such	as	home-based	
care	and	social	events,	although	not	all	branches	provide	comprehensive	
services.	
The	Meals	on	Wheels	branch	analyzed	as	part	of	this	study	is	located	in	
south	 Johannesburg	near	Turffontein	 and	delivers	meals	 to	 the	elderly	
and	has	food	pickup	from	its	area	office	as	well.	This	particular	branch	
urban food security series no. 6  29
location	was	chosen	due	 to	 its	 relatively	unusual	 situation	of	providing	
food	 both	 to	 CBOs	 and	 directly	 to	 individuals.	 Typically,	 other	 food	
security	NGOs	work	 through	CBOs	only	as	 a	way	 to	 feed	communi-
ties.	Additionally,	Meals	on	Wheels	at	this	location	has	provided	food	to	
FoodBank	Johannesburg	staff.	
In	the	2007-2008	fiscal	year,	the	national	budget	for	Meals	on	Wheels	in	
South	Africa	was	R19.9	million,	while	the	2008-9	fiscal	year	budget	for	
the	specific	Johannesburg	branch	located	in	Turffontein	was	R480,000	
with	 100%	 coming	 from	 private	 donations.	 The	 Turffontein	 branch	
served	 approximately	 20,000	 per	 month	 from	 its	 south	 Johannesburg	
location	(Table	6).	Thus,	while	this	branch	is	quite	small	in	comparison	to	
other	NGOs	in	this	study,	its	impact	is	actually	large	in	terms	of	numbers	
served.	When	put	 in	context,	 this	Meals	on	Wheels	branch	combined	
with	the	other	35	branches,	have	a	major	impact	throughout	the	Johan-
nesburg	metropolitan	area,	particularly	for	the	elderly.	
TABLE 6:  Meals on Wheels Organisational Profile
Organisation Location Haddon, Johannesburg
Organisation Service Area Turffontein
Food Gardening No
Feeding Schemes Yes
Soup Kitchen Yes
Other Services No
Served per Month 20,000 people
Want to Serve per Month 50,000 people
Size of Budget R480,000 
Private donations 100%
 Foreign Private Donations 0%
 Domestic Private Donations 100%
Foundation Grants 0%
 Foreign Foundation Grants 0%
 Domestic Foundation Grants 0%
Percentage Government Grants and Contracts 0%
 Foreign Government Grants and Contracts 0%
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 Domestic Government Grants and Contracts 0%
Fees, Sales, and Dues 0%
Investment Income 0%
Rental Income 0%
Other Income 0%
Lack of Government Funding No
Lack of Private Donations Yes
Lack of Contacts with Potential Funding Sources No
Delays and Red Tape Associated with Financial 
Support No
Other Problems No
Full Time Paid Staff 6 people
Part Time Paid Staff 4 people
Volunteers 6 people
Hours per Week Spent Applying for Government 
Money 0 
Hours per Week Organisation Spends Raising Private 
Sector Money 5 
Percentage of Staff With College or University 
Degrees 20%
Heard about FoodBank South Africa Yes
Means of learning about FoodBank South Africa GFN
Effect of Food Bank South Africa on Your Organisation Very Positive
4.5  Food Delivery NGOs: Relationship with  
 FoodBank Johannesburg
Joint	Aid	Management,	Robin	Good	 Initiative,	 and	Meals	 on	Wheels	
all	 chose	 affiliation	with	FoodBank	 Johannesburg,	 rather	 than	amalga-
mation.	Meals	on	Wheels	is	intercontinental	in	reach	and	deeply	rooted	
in	communities	and	was	therefore	always	likely	to	resist	full	integration	
into	FoodBank	Johannesburg.	As	faith-based	organizations,	JAM	and	the	
Robin	Good	Initiative	were	hesitant	to	lose	their	religious	identities:
	 We	 started	 this	 as	 a	Christian	 organisation.	 I	was	 called	 to	 do	 this	
(by	God).	Now,	 (I	 am	suppose	 to)	hand	over	 (control)	 to	 the	 food	
bank,	to	a	non-Christian,	non-religious	(organisation).	(I	don’t	want	
to)	 take	a	Christian	organisation	and	dump	it	 in	 there	and	 lose	 the	
Christian	ethos	of	the	whole	thing.74	
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According	to	administrators	at	JAM	and	Meals	on	Wheels,	neither	NGO	
operates	according	to	the	food	bank	logic:
	 They	 (Feedback	 and	 the	 Joburg	 Foodbank)	 are	 actually	 dissolving	
into	the	food	bank.	That’s	because	they	are	food	bank	organisations,	
(but	our	organisation)	 isn’t	 (a	 food	bank).	What	 (our	organisation)	
will	do	and	what	any	organisation	(will	do)	that	signs	up	(to	join)	the	
food	bank	is	that	you	will	source	all	of	your	food	through	the	food	
bank.	So,	even	if	we	got	a	grant	with	money	for	food,	we	would	actu-
ally	source	that	food	through	the	food	bank.75	
Yet,	 in	spite	of	 these	differences,	all	 three	organizations	said	 they	were	
supportive	 of	 the	 food	 bank’s	 efforts	 to	 streamline	 food	 donation	
processes,	 increase	 the	 amount	of	 food	delivered	 to	 the	 food	 insecure,	
reduce	 food	waste,	 and	 expand	 the	 number	 of	 institutions	 committed	
to	food	security.76	The	managers	of	these	affiliated	NGOs	thus	decided	
to	explicitly	support	the	food	bank,	yet	maintain	their	own	identities	as	
NGOs.	
JAM	has	representation	on	FoodBank	South	Africa’s	board	of	members,	
while	Meals	on	Wheels	has	provided	meals	for	FoodBank	Johannesburg’s	
workers.	 The	 Robin	 Good	 Initiative’s	 relationship	 with	 FoodBank	
Johannesburg	is	a	bit	less	clear.	Although	the	Robin	Good	Initiative	in	
Cape	Town	folded	its	operations	into	FoodBank	Cape	Town,	the	Johan-
nesburg	Robin	Good	Initiative	has	remained	supportive	of	the	Johannes-
burg	FoodBank	but	has	yet	to	publicly	express	a	formal	relationship	with	
the	food	bank.77	Most	likely,	it	will	remain	independent	yet	supportive	of	
the	food	bank’s	overall	goals.
The	managers	of	each	NGO	also	expressed	concerns	about	the	possible	
impacts	of	 the	 food	bank	on	 their	operations.	The	 food	bank	will,	 for	
example,	inevitably	affect	existing	donor	relationships.	FBSA	and	Food-
Bank	Johannesburg	have	secured	food	from	food	manufacturers	and	food	
retailers,	companies	that	once	gave	food	directly	to	NGOs.	While	these	
donor-NGO	 recipient	 relationships	 still	 exist	 in	many	places,	 they	 are	
vulnerable	to	the	new	food	bank	bureaucracy.	As	one	food	retailer	noted:	
“That	is	one	of	our	challenges	--	How	do	we	marry	this	whole	food	bank	
(network)	into	what	already	exists,	without	some	of	the	charities	that	we	
have	been	working	with	for	twenty	years	just	being	cut	out	completely?”78
As	 FoodBank	 Johannesburg	 gains	 in	 size	 and	 legitimacy,	 these	 food	
delivery	 NGOs	 may	 have	 to	 change	 their	 relationship	 with	 the	 food	
bank,	 as	 their	donor	 relationships	become	either	 co-opted	or	 strained.	
While	the	development	of	FoodBank	Johannesburg	has	streamlined	food	
donation	efforts,	it	is	not	clear	whether	the	food	bank	will	add	or	reduce	
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bureaucratic	hurdles.	The	NGOs	might	well	be	affected	by	new	bureau-
cratic	hurdles,	 such	as	member	 fees,	 forced	pick-up	of	 food	 stuffs,	 and	
overall	ineffective	beneficiary	agency	monitoring	and	evaluation.	More	
significant,	if	FoodBank	South	Africa	is	to	become	the	most	important	
NGO	player	in	food	security	in	South	African	cities,	it	is	unclear	if	it	will	
actually	be	capable	of	contributing	to	lower	food	insecurity	rates.	
FoodBank	Johannesburg’s	effects	on	civil	society	have	been	quite	uneven	
to	date.	Before	the	development	of	FoodBank	Johannesburg,	food	secu-
rity	NGOs	tended	 to	work	directly	with	 food	manufacturers	and	 food	
retailers.	 NGOs	 accepted	 funding	 from	 private	 foreign	 and	 domestic	
donors	and	received	food	donations	from	food	manufacturers	and	food	
retailers	 and	 then	 supplied	 these	 in-kind	 donations	 directly	 to	CBOs.	
Now,	 with	 the	 development	 of	 FoodBank	 Johannesburg,	 NGO	may	
have	 to	 reshape	 their	 relationships	 with	 both	 the	 private	 sector	 and	
CBOs.	While	 these	 three	NGOs	remained	strong	as	of	2009,	 it	 is	not	
clear	whether	they	will	be	able	to	compete	with	the	food	bank	as	it	takes	
over	relationships	with	former	donors	and	earns	more	financial	contracts	
with	private	and	public	agencies.	
5. concluSIon
The	American	food	banking	model	has	developed	in	South	Africa	with	
the	assistance	of	key	institutional	players	such	as	the	Global	FoodBanking	
Network.	FoodBank	Johannesburg,	the	largest	of	these	food	banks,	has	
the	potential	to	transform	the	ways	that	food	security	NGOs	operate	in	
Johannesburg.	The	 introduction	of	 the	American	 food	banking	model	
into	Johannesburg	has	some	positive	outcomes,	including	increasing	the	
number	of	institutions	committed	to	food	security	and	streamlining	food	
donation	processes.	The	development	of	 food	banking	in	South	Africa	
also	raises	many	important	questions.
While	food	banking	will	have	a	major	impact	on	the	organisation	of	food	
redistribution	within	South	African	urban	areas,	 it	 is	not	clear	what	 its	
impact	 will	 be	 on	 food	 insecurity	 in	 the	 cities.	 Data	 from	 FoodBank	
Johannesburg	has	shown	a	significant	increase	in	food	delivery,	providing	
more	 than	200	metric	 tons	each	month	 to	over	440	beneficiary	 agen-
cies.79	Even	though	it	is	clear	that	the	food	banking	network	is	growing	
in	South	Africa,	it	is	not	known	whether	this	increase	in	food	delivered	
is	in	addition	to	or	in	place	of	food	delivered	by	other	NGOs	before	food	
banks	started	functioning.	As	food	insecurity	rates	 in	South	Africa	and	
Johannesburg	 remain	 high,	 it	 will	 be	 important	 to	 critically	 examine	
the	real	long-term	potential	of	the	food	bank	as	a	model	to	reduce	food	
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insecurity	rates,	especially	as	food	bank	models	expand	across	the	country	
and	region.	
As	noted	above,	FBSA	has	ambitious	plans	to	extend	its	operations	outside	
the	large	metropolitan	centres	of	South	Africa.	Even	though	food	banks	
currently	only	exist	in	two	African	countries	--	namely	South	Africa	and	
Ghana	--	it	is	likely	that	the	food	banking	model	will,	over	time,	be	advo-
cated	for	other	countries	and	cities	in	Southern	Africa.80	Most	of	these	
countries	also	lack	the	state-funded	social	protection	schemes	that	have	
grown	rapidly	in	South	Africa	over	the	last	decade.	They	do	not	have	a	
well-developed	private	sector,	especially	among	food	manufacturers	and	
retailers,	which	 can	 sufficiently	 contribute	 to	 the	 food	banking	model	
which	 the	Global	FoodBanking	Network	 and	FoodBank	South	Africa	
espouse.	As	the	North	American	model	of	food	banking	is	dependent	on	
“excess”	food	and	money	from	the	corporate	sector,	it	is	unclear	how	the	
food	banking	 schematic	could	operate	at	 all	 in	other	Southern	African	
countries.	On	other	hand,	the	rapid	expansion	of	South	African	super-
markets	and	agri-food	chains	into	the	region	could	well	provide	some	of	
the	pre-conditions	for	an	expansion	of	food	banking	regionally.
FoodBank	South	Africa	was	only	 able	 to	 form	after	national	 and	 local	
levels	of	governments	committed	money	and	political	will	to	the	broader	
aims	of	the	food	banking	project.	In	comparison	to	South	Africa,	it	seems	
unlikely	 that	 neighbouring	 countries	 have	 the	 institutional	 capacity	 to	
adequately	support	such	a	large-scale	food	banking	model,	especially	with	
other	 urban	 crises,	 such	 as	 persistent	 poverty	 in	 informal	 settlements,	
high	demand	for	social	services,	rapid	in-migration,	and	the	debilitating	
effects	of	HIV	 and	AIDS.	Overall,	 the	North	American	 food	banking	
model	 has	 never	 been	 tested	 in	 a	 context	 outside	 upper	 and	 middle	
income	countries.	Thus,	as	low-income	countries	have	the	highest	levels	
of	food	insecurity,	it	is	exactly	in	these	high-need	locations	where	food	
banks	may	not	work	effectively.	
More	broadly,	it	is	not	clear	whether	the	food	bank	has	evolved	in	conjunc-
tion	with	or	in	opposition	to	the	South	African	state.	While	FoodBank	
South	Africa	received	financial	assistance	from	the	South	African	state,	
it	is	not	clear	how	the	food	bank-state	relationship	will	evolve	over	time.	
According	to	Poppendieck	and	other	scholars	of	food	banking	in	North	
America,	 the	 central	 state	 has	 benefitted	 from	 food	 banking	 develop-
ment,	as	it	has	reduced	political	pressure	on	social	welfare	programmes	
and	ultimately	def lected	focus	from	the	state	to	the	non-profit	sector.81	
Poppendieck	argues	that	food	bank	growth	has	had	significantly	affected	
the	 broader	 poverty	 discourse.	 Instead	 of	 asking	why	 people	 are	 food	
insecure,	attention	has	focused	on	building	an	ever-larger	social	service	
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structure	to	feed	the	hungry.	While	this	discursive	shift	in	North	Amer-
ican	cities	is	profound	and	well-documented,	it	has	definitely	not	materi-
alized	yet	in	South	Africa.	As	food	banking	spreads	from	South	Africa	to	
neighbouring	Southern	African	nations,	it	is	important	to	examine	how,	
if	at	all,	food	banking	will	defer	political	attention	to	food	insecurity	from	
the	state	to	NGOs	or	other	institutional	players.	
Although	 given	 little	 attention	 in	 this	 report,	more	 research	 needs	 to	
be	 conducted	 to	 assess	 the	 reasons	 how	 and	 why	 private	 sector	 food	
manufacturers	and	food	retailers	participate	in	the	food	banking	process.	
Food	 businesses	 inevitably	 receive	 good	 public	 relations,	 potential	 tax	
deductions,	and	markets	for	unsellable	food	products.	Researchers	need	
to	 identify	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 food	 manufacturers	 and	 retailers	 are	
actually	profiting	 from	the	 food	banking	system.	We	need	to	ask	what	
institutional	role	they	should	have	in	a	food	redistribution	system	which	
theoretically	exists	to	reduce	food	insecurity,	not	help	agribusinesses	or	
other	 food	businesses.	These	 assertions	 clearly	 need	more	 attention	 in	
future	research	endeavours.	It	is	also	critical	to	analyze	the	impacts	of	food	
bank	development	on	urban	food	insecurity	levels	over	time.	The	food	
banking	process	also	needs	to	be	examined	in	its	inter-urban	context	to	
examine	how	and	why	food	banks	have	developed	in	certain	countries	
and	cities	and	not	others.	As	urban	areas	in	developing	regions,	such	as	
Southern	Africa,	continue	to	transform	rapidly,	it	is	critical	for	scholars,	
urban	managers,	and	policymakers	to	understand	how	various	food	secu-
rity	 interventions,	 such	as	 food	banks,	evolve	 in	cities	and	 identify	 the	
roles	that	local	urban	governance	structures	play	in	facilitating	food	bank	
growth,	social	change,	and	the	reduction	of	food	insecurity.	
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In most African cities, there is sufficient food to feed everyone and 
considerable wastage of fresh and processed foodstuffs. Poor house-
holds are food insecure because they cannot afford to purchase enough 
quality food and are unable to access the surplus food that exists. 
Food redistribution NGOs are well established in Southern Africa but 
more recently large centralized food banks have been advocated as 
a means to get surplus food to the hungry. In 2009, the first food 
banks opened in the South African cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg, 
Durban and Port Elizabeth. The South African model of food collec-
tion and distribution was developed in collaboration with American 
food bankers. This paper examines the arrival of American-style food 
banking in Southern Africa and its potential to “depoliticise” the 
problem of urban food insecurity. More food banks are planned for 
other South African cities. While foodbanking can offer temporary 
relief for the urban food insecure, they do not address the deeper, 
structural causes of food insecurity.
